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Cognitive polyphasia has mainly been used to address encounters between innovative 
scientific knowledge and local, traditional knowledge. Yet, change and innovation occur 
in many spheres of life, not just in the scientific one. In this paper we examine the 
encounter between new laws – or legal innovations – and local knowledge, and discuss 
how the normative force of new laws shapes communication and cognitive polyphasia. 
We specifically focus on the Generalisation phase of legal innovation, when new laws 
are translated into concrete practices, the social debate is more intense, and cognitive 
polyphasia is more likely to occur. We present empirical data from focus groups and 
interviews to illustrate how this happens for the specific case of the reception of new 
biodiversity conservation laws affecting communities living in protected sites. We also 
examine the positions of professionals from local mediating systems, illustrating how 
they manage the dilemmas linked to the introduction of new laws. The results illustrate 
the contexts of use of non-polyphasic and polyphasic interventions; they also show how 
polyphasia is expressed by two divergent argumentative formats (thematisation and 
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conventionalisation), whose conjugation is indispensable for trying to contest the law 
while still respecting the normative meta-system. The findings are discussed taking into 
account the macro-societal consequences of cognitive polyphasia, trying to show how, at 
the societal level, it may contribute to slowing down social change. We also discuss how 
this is related to the enablement of emancipated representations, those where uncertainty 
and ambivalence more clearly emerge and sustain the negotiation of meaning. 
 
 
The concept of cognitive polyphasia has helped examine how individuals and groups resort to 
different types of knowledge and forms of thinking for coping with change and innovation 
(Gervais & Jovchelovitch, 1998; Moscovici, 2008; Wagner, Duveen, Verma, & Themel, 1999). 
However, although change and innovation occur in many spheres of life, until now the notion of 
cognitive polyphasia has predominantly been used to address encounters between scientific 
knowledge and local knowledge. Examining whether and how polyphasia occurs in other 
encounters, such as those where local knowledge confronts the force and formality of new laws – 
or legal innovations – may help expand our understanding of its characteristics and functions. 
Therefore, in this paper we examine how the normative force of new laws shapes 
cognitive polyphasia in legal-local knowledge encounters. We further expand the notion by 
linking it more explicitly with other concepts of the theory of social representations. In this 
regard, we will argue that the notion of cognitive polyphasia assumes particular relevance in the 
context of one specific type of representations – emancipated ones (Moscovici, 1988). Moreover, 
we will argue that the notion can also expand our understanding of the operation of the normative 
meta-system in the context of emancipated representations, at the inter-personal and societal 
levels. 
We view cognitive polyphasia as having two components: (1) it is a property of human 
thought enabling the self to use different rationalities, reasoning forms, or knowledge modalities, 
each characteristic of the different spheres of social life; (2) because meaning is heterogeneous, 
both within and across spheres, cognitive polyphasia also enables the self to draw arguments 
from different belief systems and spheres when resorting to different rationalities. Thus defined, 
cognitive polyphasia is clearly more an issue of social re-presenting than of social 
representations. In other words, the forms and functions of cognitive polyphasia are better 
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understood if we focus on relational, conversational, interactional aspects, looking at how re-
presentation happens in concrete communicative practices.  
A further contribution of the paper will be the placing of cognitive polyphasia in a 
temporal context. Social change promoted by legal innovation follows several phases and 
cognitive polyphasia arguably has higher expression in the Generalisation phase of legal 
innovation (Castro, 2012; Castro & Mouro, 2011), when the new laws have been issued and need 
to be translated into concrete practices. It is during this phase that individuals, mediating systems 
and groups actively negotiate different translations and the social debate can become intense.  
In the pages that follow, we substantiate the aforementioned ideas and illustrate them by 
specifically looking at how communities and mediating systems from Natura 2000 sites
1
 receive 
and negotiate the new biodiversity conservation laws. For this, we analyse focus groups and 
interviews, showing that even when social practices are strongly constrained by legal norms, 
debate and resistance are still possible, with consequences for the transformation of ideas and 
practices. We namely examine:  
1) The discursive formats through which polyphasia is expressed, identifying ideas that 
are conventionalised (re-affirmed, but left un-discussed) and ideas that are thematised 
(Marková, 2008; Mouro, 2011), thereby exploring how the normative meta-system 
(Moscovici, 2008) shapes cognitive polyphasia;  
2) the tensions between the two types of knowledge (legal and local) in the discourse of 
local residents and in that of professionals from local mediating systems involved in 
implementing the new laws;  
3) how the discursive formats adopted help sustain the dialogue between different, 
alternative representations, a characteristic of emancipated representations.  
Finally we discuss the societal consequences of polyphasia, debating how it can 
contribute to either accelerating or slowing down social change.  
 
 
 
                                                 
1
 The Natura 2000 sites constitute an EU-wide network of nature protection areas established under the 1992 
Habitats Directive. They now cover about 20% of the EU territory.  
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COGNITIVE POLYPHASIA AND THE TEMPORAL CONTEXT OF LEGAL 
INNOVATION 
 
Moscovici (2008) proposed the concept of cognitive polyphasia for addressing how “an 
individual (or collective) subject can use a plurality of modes of reflection” (p.193), with the aim 
of deepening our understanding of how different spheres of knowledge co-exist and transform 
each other. More recently, research has shown how distinct rationalities and types of knowledge 
are indeed used by individuals and groups for choosing among available practices, making sense 
of their relationships or justifying their everyday options in contexts of innovation and change 
brought by scientific knowledge (Castro & Lima, 2001; Gervais & Jovchelovitch, 1998; 
Provencher, 2011; Wagner et al., 1999). However, and as mentioned, innovation can emerge 
from other spheres besides the scientific one (Castro, 2012), and in this paper we address 
cognitive polyphasia in the context of legal innovation, focusing specifically on how biodiversity 
conservation laws regulating Natura 2000 protected areas are locally received.  
For contextualising this reception, let us first set it in its temporal context. Innovative 
concerns with biodiversity entered European societies in the middle of the 20
th
 century through 
the influence of (then) minority ecological movements, which established the first stage of legal 
innovation: the Emergence stage (Castro & Mouro, 2011). After gathering public support - from 
the late 1980s onwards - conservation concerns began to be institutionalized in European Union 
(EU) member states. During the Institutionalisation stage, the sites integrating the Natura 2000 
network were defined with the help of ecological experts; the laws regulating them were devised 
by the European Commission in the early 1990s and then transposed to the legal frameworks of 
member states. At this point, the third phase of change, the Generalisation one, was initiated. 
During this stage – the present one - the new legal imperatives for the protection of endangered 
species have to be made effective and translated into concrete practices, and meet and confront 
previous local practices and ideas. Such imperatives include the prohibition of intensive farming 
practices or restrictions to new constructions, for both small (e.g., residential buildings) and 
large-scale projects (e.g., highways or dams). 
The Generalisation stage has high socio-psychological relevance, since in the encounters 
it fosters, the appropriation and translation of the legal innovations trigger debate, negotiation, 
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contestation and transformation of meanings and practices. Research shows that the reception of 
Natura 2000 laws has been marked simultaneously by a high endorsement of biodiversity 
protection as a valid societal goal and by some local contestation (Buijs, 2009; Castro, Mouro & 
Gouveia, 2012; Hovardas & Korfiatis, 2008; Mouro & Castro, 2010). This poses the question of 
how can individuals and communities resist and contest in practice the new laws created for 
supporting a highly normative societal goal. In other words, how can individuals and 
communities simultaneously attempt to negotiate the laws and respect the normative meta-system 
that intervenes in communicative practices by stating “which combinations of available 
propositions are permissible and which are forbidden” (Moscovici, 2008, p.168)? Moreover, how 
can this be achieved when the normative meta-system does not just comprise informal (there is 
public support for its goals) but also formal (the goals are backed by actual laws) norms? For 
answering these questions we need to set the notion of cognitive polyphasia more clearly in the 
context of change fostered by legal innovations. 
 
COGNITIVE POLYPHASIA AND THE CHARACTERISTICS OF LEGAL 
INNOVATION 
 
Cognitive polyphasia is both stimulated and supported by some of the specific characteristics of 
legal innovation that we shall now briefly address (see Castro, 2012; Castro & Mouro, 2011 for 
detailed renderings). The first characteristic refers to the fact that, in order to be able to regulate 
different social groups in many different contexts, laws are usually written in rather generic and 
unspecific terms, and always need to be translated to concrete, specific contexts (Castro, 2012; 
Castro & Mouro, 2011). This translation process moves the laws from the societal/generic to the 
local/specific level, and opens space for communities and mediating systems to debate them. For 
this, they can either draw arguments from different and competing belief systems and rationalities 
(Batel & Castro, 2009; Castro et al., 2012), or from only one of them. In other words, the 
arguments in these debates can be non-polyphasic – for instance, defending the “primacy of the 
law” as a societal imperative (Tuffin & Frewin, 2008) and/or establishing prescriptions for 
representations or actions, through a reification-like communication (Batel & Castro, 2009); or 
they can be polyphasic, articulating distinct knowledges and different positions and revealing 
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awareness that actions and representations are adapted to context (Batel & Castro, 2009; 
Provencher, 2011), and discussing for instance the extent to which the law responds to contextual 
specificities. 
A second characteristic of legal innovation relates to the relevance that needs to be 
accorded to mediating systems as active social agents in the reception and co-construction of 
legal innovation (Castro & Batel, 2008; Morant, 2006; Morant & Edwards, 2011; Mouro, 2011; 
Renedo & Jovchelovitch, 2007). For the study of polyphasia, it is important to understand which 
discursive formats and arguments are used by these systems in the presentation of the new laws, 
since they may echo the tensions emerging from dialogical relations between their professional 
agenda, the community/contextual demands and the statutory demands (Aveling, 2011; Renedo 
& Jovchelovitch, 2007).  
Finally, a third and very central specificity of legal innovations regards the fact that, in 
order to fully fulfil their role, new formal laws need to become informal forms of regulation 
across different contexts (Castro, 2012). In other words, the goals, values, ideas and practices (or 
representations) promoted by the laws need to become hegemonic, i.e., uniform and coercive 
across a structured group, like a nation, as the definition of hegemonic representation proposes 
(Moscovici, 1988, p. 221). Yet, this can only happen over time, during the Stabilisation phase, 
and only if the Generalisation phase has been successful (Castro, 2012). In the transition period, 
before full generalisation and acceptance of the laws, the law-associated representations are better 
described as emancipated. This means that, despite the social support offered to the generic 
values on which they are founded, “each subgroup creates its own version” of them and the goals 
they promote “and shares it with the others” (Moscovici, 1988, p.221).  
In this Generalisation period, the translation of laws into concrete practices and specific 
contexts is intensely negotiated in everyday debates. Yet, these are not the blatant, 
confrontational and polarized conflicts associated with polemic representations; these are the 
everyday, subtle, re-signification-lead clashes in which individuals do not seek the substitution of 
one representation for another. They seek to remain in dialogue and to achieve some coordination 
of meaning and action, while still maintaining the space for creating and sharing the 
aforementioned own versions. One way of assuring this is by expressing a conventionalized 
agreement with the laws, followed by a thematisation contesting them and putting forward local 
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projects and interests (Mouro, 2011). This evidences the operation of the meta-system, and in this 
case, means that, when needed, a generic agreement with formal norms can be presented to 
guarantee that local projects and perspectives can also be put forward in discourse.  
 
SYNTHESIS AND SPECIFIC GOALS 
 
In sum, the above suggests that the Generalisation stage of legal innovation – when the new laws 
are translated into concrete practices and debate is intense – is a period of emancipated 
representations during which distinct rationalities are in a polyphasic way brought into dialogue. 
Through that dialogue, open confrontation opposing the laws is avoided, as it would violate the 
normative meta-system (Doise, 1993), and these rationalities and the arguments supporting them 
are simultaneously connected and kept distinct from one another. This is consequently not a 
period of blatant conflict but a moment for conflicts of interpretation.  
The general purpose of this paper is then to contribute to a more comprehensive 
understanding of cognitive polyphasia as it happens in the context of the encounters between 
legal and local knowledge that take place during the Generalisation phase of legal innovation, 
when emancipated representations are to be expected. Since cognitive polyphasia is better 
understood by examining communication and discourse (Jovchelovitch, 2007), we analysed 
interviews and focus groups with local community members, as well as with professionals from 
the mediating systems that intervene in the translation of the laws. The transcripts from these 
interviews and focus groups were used for capturing how the discourses were organized in order 
to manage the tensions opened up by the imperatives of not violating a doubly powerful meta-
system, both informally and formally supported, while maintaining space for discussing and 
resisting the laws.  
Concretely, our first specific goal was to examine the specific communicative practices 
through which polyphasia is expressed in contexts constrained by legal norms. For this the use of 
either thematization or conventionalization arguments was examined, and the themata more 
frequently used were identified. We also analysed how the concrete arguments constructed 
biodiversity conservation as either a local or a global issue and assessed how this helps 
supporting or resisting the laws. The second specific goal was to examine how professionals who 
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help implementing the laws deal with the tensions between formal knowledge about biodiversity 
conservation and local knowledge and practices, and how their arguments were linked to their 
professional projects.  
 
DATA COLLECTION 
 
The data presented here comes from six focus groups with thirty-three local residents and from 
seven semi-structured interviews with landowners and local professionals working on 
biodiversity conservation issues. The interviews and group discussions focused on the 
participants’ evaluation of local changes, their attitudes and experiences as residents in a 
protected area, and the involvement of local communities in the designation of those areas into 
protected sites.  
Interviews and focus groups were recorded and transcribed verbatim. The analysis of the 
resulting material was theoretically guided: we tried to understand how the participants 
responded with regards to several dialogical components of the representational process (details 
can be found in Mouro, 2011). In this paper, however, we focus only on how the laws that 
regulate biodiversity conservation are re-presented in either polyphasic or non-polyphasic 
interventions, on the discursive formats the arguments assumed in these interventions, and on the 
themata they develop. 
 
ANALYSIS 
 
Let us start by presenting a synthetic overview of the interventions of the participants about the 
new laws. There were a few non-polyphasic interventions, either defending the law with 
arguments about the “primacy of the law”, or blatantly contesting it. Yet, while the “followers” of 
the law were not confronted by others in the debate, those blatantly opposing the law received 
interpellations from other participants, reminding them of the limits of the debate. They 
subsequently reviewed their position, affirming their agreement with the laws, in a polyphasic 
manner.  
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There were very few of these interventions, however. By far more frequent were 
interventions expressing simultaneous agreement and disagreement with the laws. These had the 
following format: subsequently to affirming their support of the laws, residents initiated their 
contestation, mobilizing heterogeneous arguments, some drawn from their knowledge of legal 
imperatives, some from local knowledge. Two main themata where used for debating the limits 
of the law: the rigidity vs. flexibility of the law and of its implementation, and the exclusion vs. 
inclusion of local concerns and priorities in the process of issuing and translating the new laws. 
The mediating system responded to this by using the same themata to distance their professional 
image from the official/governmental position, contested by the local residents.  
In the following pages we offer examples of the communicative processes and discursive 
strategies that uphold the expression of such polyphasic and non-polyphasic accounts regarding 
the new laws. We first present some excerpts illustrating the positioning of local residents. Then 
we present excerpts with the position of the mediating professionals. The quotations presented 
here reflect main trends in the data.  
 
Legal innovation for biodiversity conservation - in the community  
 
We start with a non-polyphasic intervention where a member of the local community defends the 
primacy of the law (Tuffin & Frewin, 2008), accentuating the force and formality of legal 
imperatives and prescribing action and representation (Batel & Castro, 2009). The person is 
voicing the formal idealized discourse of dura lex, sed lex, insisting that the law must be 
integrally respected, and no bending of the ecological imperatives should be allowed.  
 
R3: In fact, what worries me is that it is forbidden to build in this land because it is 
an agricultural land reserve and an ecological reserve, and yet… we see some 
constructions there anyway … I’ve (elsewhere) watched fantastic, unique bits of 
our natural heritage just disappear … a degradation of the natural heritage that 
before was at our disposal. … So, I think one must preserve it, I think that some 
values are indeed superior to others. (designer, FG.3) 
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To justify her position, the person argues that the edification of infrastructures is making a 
unique natural heritage disappear and this justifies having nature preservation assuming a top 
place in the hierarchy of values. In this extract, is worth noting that the refusal to admit (further) 
exceptions to the law rests on a call for community members to acknowledge loss of biodiversity 
as a local problem, proposing they be custodians of the local natural heritage. In this way, having 
biodiversity conservation as a top priority would also be prioritizing local matters. This extract, 
defending the law as an unbendable imperative, admitting no polyphasia, is therefore also an 
example of the fact that residents can voice the formality of legal imperatives while still linking 
them to local matters; here, this is done by underlining the convergence between global and local 
issues. To be remarked is also that although non-polyphasic and confrontational, this argument is 
not followed by contestation from the group. 
The next extract illustrates a different case. It shows what often happens when non-
polyphasic accounts contesting the new laws emerge; it exemplifies how, during the debate in the 
group, a tension is created to maintain the support for the norm: 
 
LA3: We had here a public session to present what was going to happen [regarding 
the construction of a new tourist resort] and I particularly remember a Professor 
from the University of [region] saying “You cannot build anything there because 
there is a community of otters that must be preserved”. And then I see 200 people, 
who have lived here all their lives, looking at each other and asking: “What is he 
talking about, what otters?” I mean, now we are all talking about an otter that lives 
here [in the protected area] but which no one has seen. I am not saying that there 
aren’t one or two otters there. 
L3: It’s just the same as for the lynx. 
LA3: It’s just the same as for the lynx. We are always dealing with the same 
issues. 
L3: Still, I think one must support biodiversity protection.  
LA3: Exactly. No. Yes, yes. (FG.1) 
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A local authority representative (LA3) presents what he considers an example of the 
excessive stringency of biodiversity conservation laws: an infra-structure that would foster 
economic development at the local level was being stopped with the argument of saving the 
otters; yet, these had never really been spotted by local residents. He was, thus, defending a 
position of open contestation to the law, based on local facts: those who had lived there all their 
lives had never seen those otters that were being used as an argument to forbid new constructions. 
At this point, another resident (L3) entered the dialogue. At first, he corroborates the position 
taken by LA3 (L3: It’s just the same…) by offering another example of an “unseen” species, the 
lynx, regarding which there were already old arguments circulating in the community (about its 
unproven existence). Yet, immediately after this, L3 evokes the general norm of support of 
conservation (Still, I think one must support biodiversity protection), thus bringing to the fore the 
meta-normative limits of the debate through a clear prescription of action and representation 
(Batel & Castro, 2009). When confronted with the reminder of the norm, LA3 immediately 
attempts to reformulate his position (Exactly. No., i.e. “Exactly, I was not saying conservation is 
not important”) and affirms his support to the norm (Yes, yes., i.e. “I think conservation must be 
supported”). This evidences how discursive formats with polyphasic characteristics, used to 
simultaneously defend legal and local knowledge, emerge from the encounter between different 
perspectives within the community.  
The next extract is from the same focus group – it follows the previous one – and 
exemplifies what is by far the most common type of argument, through which the local 
community tells the institutional Alter (the Government) that the new laws need to be better 
adjusted to the local context. This excerpt shows how LA3 now adopts a more elaborated 
discursive pattern to criticize the law. In the first utterance, he expresses agreement with 
biodiversity protection. In fact, he conventionalises biodiversity conservation (Mouro, 2011) by 
merely restating the norm; this lack of substantive argumentation denounces this utterance as 
deferring to a social convention (Marková, 2008) and evidences meta-knowledge about the social 
relevance the laws acquired, i.e., knowledge about the normative meta-system.  
The discursive format consists then of affirming, at first, that biodiversity protection is a 
valid goal and, then, contesting the translation of this social norm to the local context:  
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LA3: I really agree and I think that, for example, regarding the bats or the lynx, or 
whatever animal it may be, very well, if they exist or existed, I believe they must 
be preserved. Now, I cannot accept that two bats, a bat-couple, will, for two years, 
prevent the construction of what could be an asset for the community. (local 
authority representative, FG.1) 
 
The second part of the intervention, separated from the first by the conjunction “now” and 
where thematization happens, also introduces one of the themata used to debate the local 
operationalization, or translation, of the laws: their rigidity vs. flexibility. By using this ‘yes, but’ 
format (Billig, 1991; Castro, 2006) the residents comply with the normative pressures while also 
suggesting a re-formulation: that the specific number of exemplars present in a specific area may 
serve as a criterion for re-defining or reformulating the limits of the law. This rhetorical 
construction (two bats, a couple) proposes that there should be a minimum number of exemplars 
needed for considering worthwhile the protection of a certain species rather than making other 
investments, such as tourist resorts, in that land. It points to the need of considering other criteria 
than the simple classification of the species as endangered; if the number of exemplars is too 
small, then the probability of success would be too low and does not justify the investment in 
protecting the species. The proposal here is, thus, to make the application of the law more 
flexible. Also, the strategy of separating the generic (the law is good) from the particular (but too 
strict) (Castro & Batel, 2008) allows the participant to distance the global problem of 
environmental protection from the local reality, here portrayed as in need of more progress and 
fewer restrictions to economic development. 
The next two extracts form a sequence evidencing how this ‘yes, but’ rhetoric format 
results from the implicit debate and negotiation with one Alter (the legal system and its offices) 
always present in the re-statement of meanings and social positions (Jovchelovitch, 2007; 
Marková, 2008). They show how the meta-knowledge about the power of the norm (Elcheroth et 
al., 2011) is an indispensable tool for entering the social debate with legitimacy (as previously 
shown by the interpellation that followed an intervention that blatantly violated the norm). It also 
allows both “mentioning” the norm (conventionalizing) only to resist it and “using” (thematising) 
local stories to defend a particular construction of reality (Howarth, 2006).  
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The excerpt also shows that this format (first affirming support to the laws, and then 
making their limitations evident) is repetitive, and is used also when they change the thema being 
developed:  
 
L2: Well, yes, I agree, I do agree; but I would like to know better what kind of 
protection is expected to occur, when can people get involved, and when they 
cannot get involved, because I think that these things should always be defined 
with the locals (landowner, Intr.2) 
 
In this case, the thema used to mobilize the Alter for negotiating new meanings is the 
exclusion vs. inclusion of local knowledge. Here local knowledge and local interests are 
portrayed as standing apart from the processes of decision-making. The argument is that 
governmental institutions are distant and, consequently, their laws exclude local reality and local 
knowledge. The appeal made to the Alter (the central government) is, therefore, to make 
biodiversity conservation a process that is “defined with the locals”. This appeal is based, again, 
on the distinction of what is global and what is local and how these two levels should be related: 
for biodiversity conservation to become a local concern, local knowledge has to be recognized 
and integrated into the laws.  
We have seen, then, that in this context of law-regulated practices, cognitive polyphasia is 
used to contest and resist societal proposals but in a subtle manner, without blatant rejection of 
the law. This is achieved, in communicative practice, through a combination of two discursive 
formats – first, the conventionalisation of the legal norm and then the thematisation of its 
operationalization, based on local knowledge. These two formats are linked, as mentioned, by the 
rhetoric construction ‘yes, but’. This rhetorical tactic is usually called an “agreement preface” and 
has been identified as a tool for mitigating disagreement towards strong views in interpersonal 
interactions (see Billig, 1991, p.179). It is not irrelevant that polyphasic processes use such a 
rhetorical device, because knowledge encounters, and consequently also polyphasia, occur in and 
through the interactions with Others (Jovchelovitch, 2007). Yet, it is also important to take into 
account what are the consequences of polyphasia as well as of these rhetorical devices for the 
pace of social change, i.e., for the societal level. In this case, it seems clear that the local 
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community is attempting to decrease the pace of change as proposed by the new laws, by 
contesting their rigidity and by proposing a different relationship between the legal and local 
spheres of knowledge.  
 
Biodiversity conservation laws through the mediating system  
 
We shall now complement this analysis by examining how the professionals of local expert 
systems talk about the laws. Generally, these biodiversity conservation professionals working 
locally, in local NGOs, use discursive constructions very similar to the ones we have identified 
within the community, that is, they usually support the new laws, but also debate them. Their 
interventions try to achieve several goals: to manage the tensions arising from encounters with 
the community; to construct their professional identity project; and to reflect the relation with a 
distant Alter (the government). In the debate they resort to polyphasic discursive formats (yes... 
but) and to the same themata used by the community: the rigidity vs. flexibility of the law and the 
exclusion vs. inclusion of the local perspective. The following excerpts illustrate this. 
 
P3: If one is talking about the Natura [2000] network then one must say that the 
environmental policies are too strict, they are too strict, period. And the Ministry 
of the Environment has not developed policies for informing the locals, it lacks a 
pedagogical approach. Well, that is also our job here, at least we make it part of 
our job, to be pedagogical regarding the locals (conservation professional, Intr.7) 
 
P1: I think that these protected areas are important, it is important to classify 
certain sites so that they can be protected. But we cannot ban Man [sic] away from 
those places … these regulations are put to use in a very stringent way, too 
stringent; they nearly stop people from building houses (conservation professional, 
Intr.5) 
 
We can see that the discursive formats and arguments used by the conservation 
professionals distance them from the governmental institution that issues the laws, by presenting 
Mouro & Castro      Cognitive Polyphasia in the Reception of Legal Innovations 
 
 
Papers on Social Representations, 21, 3.1.-3.21 (2012) [http://www.psych.lse.ac.uk/psr/] 
 
the Government as rigid (environmental policies are too strict) and not caring for community 
involvement (has not developed policies for informing the locals). This, in turn, allows these 
professionals to present themselves and their professional projects as flexible and concerned with 
community involvement.  
However, these professionals still have to acknowledge the norm, not only as a legal 
imperative, but also because the expertise behind the new laws is closely related to their own area 
of performance (it is important to classify certain sites). These tensions put the professionals in 
dilemmatic conflicts between, on the one hand, the recognition of their role and expertise as 
conservationists and, on the other, the advocacy of local projects (building houses). Yet, the 
recognition of their professional role is also a way of defining their own position as experts 
authorised to inform the locals and capable of devising pedagogical ways to help them 
understand the new laws. And by doing this, they propose thus a much less active role for the 
community in the re-construction of the laws than the one residents propose for themselves. As 
noticed in other contexts, here as well, the consequence of proposing a pedagogical relationship 
between them and the community may be the marginalisation of those apparently being defended 
(Renedo, 2010). This suggests that the polyphasic arguments of these professionals – much like 
those of the local community – may result in a slowing down of social change as proposed by the 
new laws. It also suggests that, by explicitly proposing a central role for their professional group 
in bridging the legal and local spheres, their arguments may be a way of calling for alterations to 
the current institutional relationships that would offer them more space for manoeuvre.  
 
DISCUSSION 
 
In this paper, we used the concept of cognitive polyphasia to examine how local communities and 
professionals deal with some of the dilemmas emerging from the encounters between legal 
imperatives and local knowledge and positions. Despite the fact that laws and regulations govern 
many domains of everyday life, the reception of legal innovation remains quite understudied. Our 
analyses of the specific case of the reception of new biodiversity conservation laws in Natura 
2000 sites show that local communities present legal innovation through both polyphasic and 
non-polyphasic discursive formats. The non-polyphasic accounts – when the new laws are 
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exclusively supported or contested – are not very frequent. This suggests that, as expected at the 
Generalisation phase of legal innovation, the laws are being debated and negotiated at the local 
level despite the societal endorsement they have attained.  
By using the concept of polyphasia to study communication and dialogue, we 
acknowledge that the self is capable of trying to reconcile diverse and opposite ways of thinking 
in creative ways (Moscovici, 2000), alternating from one side of the dilemma to the other (Billig 
et al., 1987), while adjusting to on-going conversations and relations. In the context of this paper, 
cognitive polyphasia was useful for understanding how normative imperatives with both informal 
and formal endorsement can be resisted in communicative practices. Our analyses suggest that 
the encounter between legal and local knowledge engenders a specific format of polyphasia, 
which first offers generic support to the norm (through conventionalization) and only then 
contests it through thematization. This “yes, but” type of discursive organization draws on some 
of the very characteristics of the legal system: as generic proposals, the laws can also be 
supported in general without compromising the possibilities of contesting and negotiating their 
specific meanings. The conventionalisation of the norm can, thus, be used to guarantee that the 
criticisms that follow are presented without severe negative social consequences for the self. The 
use of different themata in the arguments that follow conventionalisation illustrates how 
polyphasic processes draw not only on the co-existence of knowledge systems, but also on the 
diversity of contents that can be found in each of these systems.  
The dilemmatic relation between legal and local knowledge is also constructed through 
the tension between the global and local dimensions. Biodiversity conservation is almost always 
presented as a global problem, but whether or not the arguments consider it also as a local issue 
depends very much on the position assumed regarding the new laws. The polyphasic processes 
emerging in the community thus maintain separated, although in balance, two distinct 
rationalities. The first rationality is linked to the type of organization of our societies, based on 
legal frameworks which express broad societal values and goals; here, values that received 
majority or highly consensual support are not to be rejected. The second rationality refers to the 
integration and recognition of specific, local, contextual “facts”, goals and concerns in the pursuit 
and edification of those global values and goals. Balancing both rationalities, cognitive 
polyphasia allows individuals to position themselves both as responsible citizens, and as local 
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residents defending the recognition of local knowledge and local interests. This evidences also 
the plasticity of the normative meta-system: while indicating the general norms that should not be 
blatantly rejected, it does not exclude the possibility of arguing for contextually relevant specific 
norms and perspectives. 
As for the local mediating systems, they offer recognition to some of the community’s 
positions. Yet, the recognition is also a way of defining their own position as experts authorised 
to inform the locals and capable of devising pedagogical ways to help these understand the new 
laws. These dilemmas are dealt with through shifting positions (Castro & Batel, 2008) and using 
polyphasia to defend both their proximity to the community and their professional identity.  
As illustrated, at the level of interaction, cognitive polyphasia is instrumental in adjusting 
discourse and communication to relational encounters. It maintains the conversation going and 
opens space for the presentation of counter-arguments without a blatant opposition to central 
norms and, thereby, avoids severe consequences for the self. But polyphasia also has 
consequences at the macro-level: it can play a role in advancing or delaying social change. As 
Elcheroth and colleagues (2011) discuss, “giving institutional support to a particular position by 
making it a law does not inoculate that position against changes in SR” (p. 18) or in social 
relations. This means that the pace of social change will be much determined by the way the type 
of debates here illustrated come, in time, to closure. In general, we could say that at this point 
many of the arguments advanced by local residents and local mediating systems, contesting the 
new biodiversity conservation laws for their stringency and demanding new forms of relationship 
between the legal and the local spheres of knowledge, may have the consequence of slowing 
down the change potentially promoted by the laws. Yet, although local communities demand the 
recognition of local knowledge and concerns, they do not argue against the existence of national 
laws or against their place in the nation as citizens. Cognitive polyphasia is then in this sense also 
a useful resource for attempting to keep the debates open while new forms of adjusting the laws, 
and maybe new forms of adjusting social relations too, are being discussed.  
It is in this sense also that cognitive polyphasia seems to enable the ongoing debate to 
construct representations which do not seek full blown polemic and polarization, but attempt to 
maintain cooperation and the negotiation of meaning. In other words, cognitive polyphasia seems 
to be here enabling emancipated representations, those which allow uncertainty and ambivalence 
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to emerge (Vala, Garcia-Marques, Gouveia-Pereira & Lopes, 1998) and sustain the negotiation of 
meaning by the everyday, subtle, battle of interpretations.  
For the future, our analyses invite comparative research. This means for instance that 
when looking at cognitive polyphasia research needs to be attentive to the type of representations 
involved and be explicit about it. From what we saw with these data and previous research (Vala 
et al., 1998; Wagner, 1995), it is worth raising the hypothesis that for polemic and hegemonic 
representations polyphasia will not be so prevalent. And perhaps for hegemonic representations 
conventionalization without thematization is the rule, while for polemic representations the rule 
might be thematization without conventionalization. It seems worth investigating these 
possibilities, and keeping inbuilt in the research designs the notion that not all representations – 
and not all knowledge encounters – are alike. 
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